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Summary
The enormous influence of hierarchical rank on social inter-
actions [1] suggests that neural mechanisms exist to
process status-related information [2] and ascribe value to
it. The ventral striatum is prominently implicated in process-
ing value and salience, independent of hedonic properties
[3, 4], and a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
study of social status perception in humans demonstrated
that viewing higher-ranked compared to lower-ranked indi-
viduals evokes a ventral striatal response [5], indicative of
a greater assignment of value/salience to higher status.
Consistent with this interpretation, nonhuman primates
value information associated with higher-ranked conspe-
cifics more than lower-ranked, as illustrated using a choice
paradigm in which monkeys preferentially take the opportu-
nity to view high-status monkeys [6]. Interestingly, this
status-related value assignment in nonhuman primates is
influenced by one’s own hierarchical rank: high-status
monkeys preferentially attend to conspecifics of high status,
whereas low-status monkeys will also attend to other low-
status monkeys [7]. Complementary to these findings, using
fMRI and a social status judgment task in humans, we
suggest a neurobiological mechanism by which one’s own
relative hierarchical rank influences the value attributed to
particular social status information by demonstrating that
one’s subjective socioeconomic status differentially influ-
ences ventral striatal activity during processing of status-
related information.
Results
During scanning, research participants were visually pre-
sented with photographs of two individuals, one of ‘‘higher
status’’ and one of ‘‘lower status’’ than the subject, and a state-
ment pertaining to one of these two individuals. Participants
were instructed to indicate by button press which person
(higher or lower status) was best described by the statement
(see Experimental Procedures and Figure 1 for details).
Behavioral Results
On a scale from 1 to 10, the participants’ subjective socioeco-
nomic status scores ranged from3 to 8 (mean6 standard devi-
ation [SD] = 6.09 6 1.38). On average, participants responded
significantly more quickly when attributing a statement to the
lower-status individual (mean 6 standard error [SE] = 2.80 6
0.07 s) compared to the higher-status individual (mean 6
SE=3.036 0.07 s) (paired t test, t22 = 3.963, p=0.0007).Overall,*Correspondence: zinkc@mail.nih.govthere were no significant differences in reaction times between
the higher-ranked participants (n = 12; status scores 7–8) and
the lower-ranked participants (n = 11; status scores 3–6)
(two-sample t test, t21 = 0.679, p = 0.505), and participants’
statusdidnot significantly correlatewith theaveragedifference
in reaction time between higher- or lower-status statement
attribution (Pearson’s r = 0.070, p = 0.752). In concordance
with the experimentally induced split bias of the statements
toward a particular status, on average, each participant judged
50.64% (SD = 8.33%) of statements as pertaining to the higher-
status individual. There were no significant differences (two-
sample t test, t21 = 0.975, p = 0.340) between the high-status
participants and the low-status participants in the percentage
of statements they judged as pertaining to the high-status or
low-status individual. Furthermore, high- and low-status
participants judged each statement similarly (see Table S1
available online).
For the 18 participants who completed follow-up rating
scales, participant subjective socioeconomic status did not
significantly correlate with the difference in valence (Pearson’s
r = 0.083, p = 0.744) or self-similarity (Pearson’s r = 0.285, p =
0.251) attributed to statements judged as pertaining to a
higher-status individual compared to a lower-status individual.
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Results
The imaging regression analysis revealed that one’s socioeco-
nomic status was significantly correlated with right ventral
striatal activity (peak: 6, 6,23; t21 = 4.87, k = 28) elicited by pro-
cessing information regarding a higher-status individual in
contrast to lower-status information (determined by idiosyn-
cratic status judgments), accounting for 53% of variance in
the ventral striatal response at the peak voxel (r2 = 0.53, p =
0.000038) (Figures 2A and 2B). More precisely, a repeated-
measures analysis of variance revealed a significant interac-
tion between subjects’ subjective socioeconomic status
(high or low) and processing of others’ status-related informa-
tion (higher-status information or lower-status information) to
predict ventral striatal responses (measured by parameter
estimates extracted from the peak voxel: 6, 6, 23) [F(1,21) =
11.00, p = 0.003]; information about a higher-status individual
evoked a greater ventral striatal response in high-status
subjects, and information about a lower-status individual
evoked a greater ventral striatal response in low-status
subjects (Figure 2C).
An exploratory whole-brain regression analysis (p < 0.001,
uncorrected for multiple comparisons) revealed no other
region in which status-related activity was positively or nega-
tively correlated with one’s own subjective socioeconomic
status.
Discussion
The present findings demonstrate that one’s subjective socio-
economic rank influences ventral striatal responses to social
status information—a neural index of self-relevance or
salience and/or value [3, 4]—suggesting that the value attrib-
uted to social status information in humans is dependent on
one’s own subjective assessment of one’s relative hierarchical
Figure 1. Schematic Diagram of the Experimental Task Performed during fMRI
Following an instruction screen (not shown), the ‘‘higher-status’’ and ‘‘lower-status’’ individuals were visually introduced to the participants. Then,
throughout the run, a statement pertaining to one of the two individuals appeared with both of their pictures displayed below. Subjects indicated which
individual (higher or lower status) the statement pertained to via button press. The picture of the selected individual was outlined. Each statement/picture
screen (28 total) was displayed for 4 s, separated by a fixation cross displayed for 2–5 s (average = 3.5 s).
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mation producing this effect are difficult to ascertain in the
current paradigm; however, the lack of a relationship between
one’s socioeconomic rank and status-related differences in
valence or self-similarity associated with the information pre-
sented to participants minimizes the possibility that how posi-
tive (or negative) the information is or how much one identifies
with the information is solely responsible. Furthermore,
features known to be influenced by valence and self-similarity,
such as trust and threat, are therefore also unlikely to be cen-
trally involved. Nevertheless, the exact aspects of the informa-
tion driving the status-dependent activation pattern in the
ventral striatum remains to be elucidated in future studies.
This study complements previous findings in nonhuman
primates [7], in which status-related value assignment, as
manifested in preferential attention, is influenced by one’s
own hierarchical rank. Specifically, it was shown that high-
status monkeys preferentially attend to other high-status
monkeys, whereas low-status monkeys attend to monkeys
of both high and low rank. Our data regarding high-status
participants is in strong accordance with that from nonhuman
primates; however, with regards to low status, the current
results differ somewhat in that low-status participants did
not seem to equally value information regarding higher- and
lower-status individuals. This discordance suggests apossible
species-specific phenomenon but may alternatively be
a consequence of the differential experimental task or differen-
tial hierarchy setup. Specifically, the hierarchy used in our
paradigm was based on socioeconomic status rather than
dominance and consisted of unknown individuals rather than
familiar individuals.
Participants’ subjective socioeconomic status was as-
sessed in relatively close proximity to the start of the experi-
mental task, thus presumably increasing the salience of the
hierarchy because participants believed that the status of
the individuals used in the task was determined in the same
manner. Although it has been previously demonstrated that
being primed to think about one’s status can alter cognitive
performance and affective experience [8], such status priming
effects are seemingly minimal in the current paradigm, as
evident by a lack of relationship between one’s status andbehavioral measures such as reaction time and statement
status judgments.
In conclusion, the current findings provide a human neurobi-
ological correlate underlying the modulation of social status-
related value by one’s own relative social rank, thus bettering
our understanding of the neural mechanisms involved in the




Twenty-three healthy, right-handed, Caucasian volunteers (11 males and 12
females) age 21–42 years (mean 6 SD = 33.41 6 6.56 years) participated in
the fMRI study. Volunteers were recruited from the Washington, DC metro-
politan area and the National Institutes of Health community. Participants
had no structural brain abnormalities, no history of psychiatric or neurolog-
ical disorders, and normal electrocardiograms and blood pressure. Each
participant gave written, informed consent for a protocol approved by the
National Institute of Mental Health Institutional Review Board. Immediately
prior to scanning, participants’ subjective socioeconomic status was deter-
mined on a scale from 1 (lowest rank) to 10 (highest rank) using the MacAr-
thur Scale of Subjective Social Status [9] (see Supplemental Experimental
Procedures).
Experimental Task
A schematic diagram of the task is provided in Figure 1. At the start of the
task (after a 10 s display of an instruction screen), participants were visually
introduced to two gender-controlled individuals—one of higher and one of
lower socioeconomic status relative to the participant—each displayed
with a statement regarding their status for 4 s. Using an event-related
design, the participants were then repeatedly (28 trials) presented with
the picture of each of the individuals and a statement pertaining to one of
the two individuals. Participants indicated which of the two individuals the
statement pertained to (time to respond = up to 4 s) via button press. At
the time of selection (button press), the photograph of the selected indi-
vidual was outlined. Participants believed that the photographs of the other
individuals, their socioeconomic status, and information used in the state-
ments were obtained from the other individuals in a previous interview
and that particular individuals were selected from a pool of possible people
based on the participant’s socioeconomic status score such that one indi-
vidual would be of higher status and one of lower status than a given partic-
ipant. Unbeknownst to subjects, these other individuals and information
about them was simulated. Although there was not a ‘‘correct’’ selection,
the statements used were status biased toward the higher-ranked (50%
of statements) or lower-ranked (50%of statements) individual. For example,
Figure 2. Influence of One’s Subjective Socioeconomic
Status on Ventral Striatal Activity Elicited by Status Informa-
tion
(A) Significant voxels within the striatal region of interest
(p < 0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons) from the
regression of blood oxygen-level dependent signal evoked
by high-status information versus low-status information
on participants’ subjective socioeconomic status. The
statistical map is overlaid on a sagittal (x = 6), coronal
(y = 6), and axial (z = 23) section of a structural template.
The color bar represents t values, ranging from 0 to 5.
(B) The significant correlation (r2 = 0.53, p = 0.000038)
between participants’ subjective socioeconomic status
and ventral striatal activity (effect size) elicited by high-status
information relative to low-status information at 6, 6, 23
(peak activated voxel from status regression analysis).
Data points represent individual participants.
(C) The significant interaction [F(1,21) = 11.00, p = 0.003]
between participants’ subjective socioeconomic status
(high or low) and processing of status information (high-
status or low-status information) on ventral striatal activity
(effect size) at 6, 6, 23. Average values across subjects are
plotted; error bars represent standard error of the mean.
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796‘‘Which person has been fired frommore than one job?’’ was biased toward
the lower-status individual, and ‘‘Which person attended an Ivy League
college?’’ was biased toward the higher-status individual. It should be
noted, however, that the degree of bias was varied to allow idiosyncratic
and varied responses (see Table S1). Each of the 28 trials (statement presen-
tation) was separated by a fixation cross, displayed for 2–5 s (average 3.5 s).fMRI Analysis
The fMRI data were analyzed using Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM5)
([10]; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). The fMRI imaging parameters and
data analysis details are presented in the Supplemental Experimental
Procedures. Using ventral striatal reactivity as a neural index of value,
a random-effects, event-related striatal region of interest (ROI) regression
analysis was performed to investigate the influence of one’s socioeconomic
status on striatal activity elicited by the main effect of status information
(attributing a statement to someone of higher status versus lower status).
The resultant statistical map was thresholded at p < 0.05, corrected for
multiple comparisons across voxels within the ROI. Tomore precisely eluci-
date the influence of one’s status on neural activity and behavior, we also
show data in a categorical rather than continuous fashion by performing
analyses in which subjects were median divided into two groups—a high-
status group (n = 12) and a low-status group (n = 11)—based on their subjec-
tive socioeconomic status scores.Follow-up Rating Scales
Eighteen (11 high-status and 7 low-status) of the 23 participants completed
two follow-up rating scale questionnaires in which they were again pre-
sented with each of the statements viewed in the experimental task. Using
a 10-point scale, participants rated the valence of each statement, from
extremely negative to extremely positive. Using a separate 10-point scale,
participants also rated the similarity of each statement to their own experi-
ences, from ‘‘not at all similar’’ to ‘‘extremely similar.’’Supplemental Information
Supplemental Information includes Supplemental Experimental Procedures
and one table and can be found with this article online at doi:10.1016/j.cub.
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